CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT & COMPANIES ACT DELAYED
In accordance with reports in Buanews, the
implementation of the new Consumer Protection Act and
Companies Act has been delayed to 1 April
2011.
The delay will enable the Department of
Trade and Industry ('the dti') to finalise all processes
required to effectively administer these two pieces of
legislation, as well as give businesses and the public enough
time to prepare themselves for compliance with the new laws,
as they will have a significant impact on business
operations.
The postponement, however, only relates to
the general implementation of the various provisions of the
two Acts. It does not extend to the establishment of the two
institutions required to implement or administer the
legislation - namely the Companies and Intellectual Property
Commission and the National Consumer
Commission.
According to the dti, the
aforementioned institutions will come into existence and
commence with administrative operations as stipulated in the
Acts in the third quarter of this financial year. The public
and stakeholders will thus be able to approach them for
assistance and guidance as soon as their establishment is
announced in due course.
Certain provisions of the
Consumer Protection Act - which became effective on 24 April
2010 - will now be implemented by the National Consumer
Commission, which will entail the current staff of the Office
of Consumer Protection.
The provisions include those
contained in Chapter 1 and Chapter 5 as well as section 120 of
the Consumer Protection Act.
Source:
Buanews
CASH THRESHOLD REPORTING REQUIRED FOR ATTORNEYS
In accordance with Government
Gazette 33596 published on 1 October 2010, all attorneys,
casinos and motor vehicle dealers are obliged to, from 4
October 2010, report cash transactions of R25 000 or more to
the Financial Intelligence Centre (‘FIC').
From 1
December 2010, the cash transaction reporting ('CTR')
obligations will apply also to dealers in Kruger Rands, as
well as financial and other institutions such as banks,
insurers, dealers in foreign exchange, financial advisors and
estate agents.
The FIC have introduced a range of
electronic reporting mechanisms, including an internet-based
reporting system. These mechanisms will enable all
participating industries and institutions to submit reports
electronically using login credentials acquired from the
FIC.
NO REASONS FOR REFUSAL OF LEAVE TO APPEAL-
CONSTITUTIONAL
Greenfields Drilling CC & Others
v Registrar of the Supreme Court of Appeal & Others CCT
53/10 [2010] ZACC 15
In the above matter, the
applicants wished to appeal against a decision of the Supreme
Court of Appeal ('SCA') refusing them leave to appeal to the
Constitutional Court, because the SCA gave no reasons for
refusing leave to appeal. The applicants therefore
applied to the Constitutional Court for direct access for
purpose of determining the constitutionality of the practice
of the SCA not to give reasons for the refusal of applications
for leave to appeal.
The Constitutional Court held that
it was not inconsistent with the Constitution for the SCA not
to furnish reasons for its decisions refusing leave to appeal
to it. The position might however be different if a
constitutional matter is involved and the SCA is not the court
of final instance. The applicants, did not however claim
that any constitutional issue would arise in the contemplated
application for leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court
and in those circumstances the application for direct access
must be adjudicated on the basis that the SCA was the court of
final instance in the application for leave to appeal that
served before it. The Constitutional Court therefore
refused the application for direct acess.
CONFERENCES AND SEMINARS
LEAD: EVICTION AND RENTAL CLAIMS
SEMINAR
The purpose of the seminar, presented
by mr Christo Smith, is to provide delegates with updates
regarding the latest case law and developments in the law of
eviction and rental claims.
Dates:
Port Elizabeth 20 October 2010; East London 22 October 2010;
Cape Town 25 October 2010; Middelburg (Mpumalanga) 19 November
2010; Bloemfontein 22 November 2010; Pretoria 25 November
2010; Johannesburg 26 November 2010; Durban 29 November
2010
Costs: Different cost structures
applicable
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REMOVAL OF RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE PROVISIONS IN TRUST
Curators Ad Litem to Certain
Beneficiaries of Emma Smith Educational Fund v The University
of KwaZulu-Natal (510/09) [2010] ZASCA 136
The
appeal in the above matter centered on the provisions of a
will creating a charitable trust, the Emma Smith Educational
Fund (‘the Fund'). The Fund was administered by the University
of Kwazulu-Natal (‘the University'). Its benefits were, in the
original terms of the will, reserved solely for white South
African women who need financial support for a tertiary
education. Applicants for a bursary must have lived in
‘Durban' for at least three years to qualify.
The
question before the Court was whether this bequest to be
administered by the University could be allowed to stand in
its racially exclusive form. The court of first instance
granted an order deleting the racially restrictive provisions
of the bequest and substituting ‘the Ethekwini Municipality'
for ‘Durban' and the curatores ad litem of the potential
beneficiaries lodged the current appeal.
The Court
found, amongst others, that the Bill of Rights applies to all
law, including the law relating to charitable trusts: '. .
.the objects of a trust will have to conform with the
disavowal of unfair discrimination under the 1996 Constitution
and the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair
Discrimination Act'.
It found that section 13 (a) and
(c) of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988 (which
empowers a court to vary trust provisions) apply to the
present issue, as the racially restrictive nature of the Fund
prevents the realisation of the testator's intentions while it
is, in addition, in conflict with the public
interest.
The court below thus correctly decided to
remove the racially restrictive conditions of the will and the
appeal was accordingly dismissed. The Court however set
aside the order of the court a quo substituting ‘the Ethekwini
Municipality' for ‘Durban'.
ROAD ACCIDENT FUND - 3 YEAR TIME LIMIT CONSTITUTIONAL
Road Accident Fund & Another v
Mdeyide (CCT/10/10) [2010] ZACC 18
In the above matter, a certain mr Mdeyide,
who is blind, illiterate and innumerate, was involved in a
motor vehicle collision. His claim for compensation in terms
of the Road Accident Fund Act ('RAF Act') was lodged with the
Road Accident Fund ('RAF'), three years and three days after
the date of the collision.
In the Eastern Cape High
Court the RAF pleaded that Mr Mdeyide's claim had prescribed
since the RAF Act stipulates that the right to claim
compensation prescribes three years after the date upon which
the cause of action arose. The High Court declared that
provision of the RAF Act unconstitutional due to the fact that
it imposed a complete bar to claims outside of the
prescription period, no matter how unusual or exceptional the
claimant's particular circumstances. The matter was then
referred to the Constitutional Court for confirmation of the
order of constitutional invalidity.
In the majority
judgment by Van der Westhuizen J the Court held that the
provisions of the Prescription Act could not apply to the RAF
Act as the two Acts were created for different purposes; the
former to apply generally and the latter to apply to claims
against the RAF based on road accidents. The identity of the
debtor, the RAF, is fundamentally different to that of the
identity of debtors in cases covered by the Prescription
Act.
Van der Westhuizen J further held that the
challenged provision limits the right of access to courts, but
that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable under
section 36 of the Constitution. He also held that the
prescription of claims is well known in law, for good reasons.
He held, further, that the fixed time period in the RAF Act is
related to a legitimate government purpose, to ensure the
continued existence and maximum efficiency of a compensation
fund for those injured in road accidents and that relaxing the
time period could seriously affect the efficiency, functioning
and financial viability of the Fund. Moreover, the time period
of three years is much longer than the periods previously
found to be unconstitutional by the
Constitutional Court and generous enough to provide for
flexibility. The High Court's order was, thus, not confirmed
and the appeal was upheld.
In a dissenting judgment by
Froneman J it was held that the challenged provision of the
RAF Act is unconstitutional as the prescription period is too
inflexible to be justified and, thus, potentially affects the
most socio-economically disadvantaged individuals in
society.
RECOMMENDED READING
The National Credit Act and consent to
judgment in terms of the Magistrates Courts Act, S Stadler, De Rebus, September 2010 |